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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
1 Introduction 
A contract can be defined as an agreement entered into between two or more legal subjects, 
who have the necessary contractual capacity to enter into the agreement and who intend to 
create legal rights and obligations, which agreement must be lawful, meet all of the prescribed 
formalities applicable to it, and be physically possible to execute.1 From this definition we can 
distil the generally accepted requirements that contracts must meet in order to enjoy legal 
recognition: consensus, contractual capacity, lawfulness, physical possibility, and formalities.2 
In light of the scope of this dissertation not all of these requirements will be considered in 
greater detail, however, a brief discussion on the requirement of consensus will be traversed 
as this requirement is central to the main issues which will be considered herein. 
1.1 Consensus as a requirement for a valid and legally enforceable contract 
The requirement of consensus provides that a contract will only exist if the parties to such 
contract have the intention to be bound to each other, and "if they intentionally reach unanimity 
on all the terms of their agreement".3 The requirement of consensus can also be referred to 
as a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.4 In order to establish whether the parties 
to a particular contract reached consensus, one will generally determine if there was an offer 
by the one party which was accepted by the party to whom the offer was made.5 Where parties 
to a contract did not reach consensus on the terms of the agreement the contract will not meet 
all of the formalities required for its validity. Accordingly, a legally enforceable contract will not 
come into existence. 
1.2 How South African Courts establish consensus 
The South African Courts (hereinafter referred to as "our courts") have on many occasions 
been approached by contractants to determine if the parties to a particular contract did in fact 
                                           
1 Nagel (ed) Otto and Prozesky-Kuschke Commercial Law (2011) 41. 
2 Nagel (ed) Otto and Prozesky-Kuschke Commercial Law (2011) 42. 
3 Fouche Legal Principles of Contracts and Commercial Law (2015) 39. 
4 Kok v Osborne & Another 1993 2 All SA 549 (SE) 557 and Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law 
of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 296. 
5 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 299. It should be 
mentioned that this is the general position. In the matter of Estate Breet v Peri Urban Areas Health Board 1955 4 All SA 48 
(A) 56, the court stated: "Consensus is normally evidenced by offer and acceptance. But a contract may be concluded 
without offer and acceptance other than pure fictions imported into the transaction for doctrinal reasons".  
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reach consensus at the time when the contract in question was entered into. This 
determination can be approached by applying various theories underlying the enforcement of 
contracts. In the South African Law (hereinafter referred to as "our law") there are three 
generally recognised theories underlying or supporting the enforcement of contracts.6  
The first is the consensual theory (a subjective approach), which provides that an agreement 
is enforceable only if the parties' subjective wills coincide.7 The second is the declaration 
theory (an objective approach), which provides that an agreement is enforceable only if the 
parties' declared intentions coincide.8 The third is the reliance theory, which provides that the 
enforceability of a contract is dependent on "the reasonable expectations conveyed to the 
mind of each party by the words or conduct of the other".9 Our courts have in various matters 
expressed an opinion on the preferred theory, however, our courts have not been consistent 
in the theory favoured. A discussion on which theory is correct will not be undertaken in this 
dissertation. However, the following two seminal paragraphs from the judgment of the 
Appellate Division in the matter Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis10, shed light on this complicated debate. This judgment is 
generally regarded as the locus classicus on this issue. 
"The law, as a general rule, concerns itself with the external manifestations, and not the 
workings, of the minds of parties to a contract… However, in the case of an alleged dissensus 
                                           
6 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 1 (Hereinafter referred to as "Christie"). 
7 n 1 above; In the matter of Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 23 the court stated: "There can be no consent where the minds of 
the parties do not meet, or, … where there is no consensus ad idem"; and in Swart v Vosloo 1965 (1) SA 100 (A) 104, the 
Appellate Division expressed its agreement with the following phrase "a lease is a mutual contract, flowing from agreement 
of the minds of the parties, a concursus animorum animo contrahendi". 
8 n 1 above; In the matter of South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704, the court 
stated that the law is not concerned with the minds of the parties to a contract but rather with the external manifestation of 
the minds of the parties; In the matter of National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 
SA 473 (A) at paragraphs 479E-F the court stated: "It would not be possible for such a natural person, if he repudiated, to 
escape liability by proving that he had posted the wrong letter or the like. That follows from the generally objective approach 
to the creation of contracts which our law follows"; The authors of Christie, argue that consensus (or a meeting of the minds) 
is not as much a legal concept as it is a philosophical concept, and further state that: "A lawyer needs proof before 
concluding that a particular state of affairs exists, and when the state of affairs in question is something as subjective as 
the states of mind of two or more parties on a particular occasion, or occasions, the lawyer will find that, in truth, the search 
is not for agreement by consent but for evidence of such agreement"; and in Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd 
1974 (4) SA 164 (D) the court rejected the strict application of the objective theory and confirmed that our law "follows a 
generally objective approach", which cannot be so rigid that it excludes a party from advancing a case based on mutual 
error. 
9 n 1 above; In the matter of Ridon v Van der Spuy and Partners Inc 2002 2 All SA 116 (C) 127 the court stated that where 
the parties did not subjectively reach consensus, i.e. where the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds, the reliance 
theory must be applied in order to determine if a valid contract exist;. In Botha v Road Accident Fund 2016 JOL 37439 
(SCA) at para 10 the court confirmed that the reliance theory allows for a contract to be regarded as valid, even in the event 
where a material mistake exists on the part of one of the contractants, if the other party to the contract "reasonably relied 
on the impression that there was consensus"; In Logwin Air and Ocean Simsonke v JNB Ceramica CC 2017 JOL 37152 
(GSJ) at para 16, the court stated that, in those cases "where actual consensus is not present, contractual liability may 
arise on the basis that one party, (the contract denier) led the other party (the contract asserter) into reasonable belief that 
consensus had been reached"; and in the matter of Van Huyssteen NO v Milla Investment & Holding Company (Pty) Ltd 
2017 JOL 37997 (SCA) at para 20, the SCA confirmed that the reliance theory is "firmly entrenched in our law". 
10 1992 2 All SA 114 (A) 117 and 119.  
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the law does have regard to other considerations: it is said that, in order to determine whether 
a contract has come into being, resort must be had to the reliance theory… 
… 
In my view, therefore, the decisive question in a case like the present is this: did the party whose 
actual intention did not conform to the common intention expressed, lead the other party, as a 
reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention represented his actual intention? … To 
answer this question, a threefold enquiry is usually necessary, namely, firstly, was there a 
misrepresentation as to one party's intention; secondly, who made that representation; and 
thirdly, was the other party misled thereby?…The last question postulates two possibilities: was 
he actually misled and would a reasonable man have been misled?"  
1.3 Factors which influence consensus 
Various factors can result in consensus being absent from an agreement. These factors can 
be categorised into four general categories: mistake, misrepresentation, duress and undue 
influence.11 For the purposes of this dissertation the reader need only take note of mistake 
and misrepresentation, as duress and undue influence will not be considered in any further as 
these concepts fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. Mistake can be summarised as 
those instances where one or more of the parties to a contract resort under some 
misunderstanding or misapprehension regarding the "facts, events or circumstances in the 
contract".12 A misrepresentation can be defined as those instances where one of the 
contractants make a false statement regarding the facts, or the circumstances surrounding 
the contract, in order to induce the other party to enter into the contract.13 
1.4 The relationship between mistake and misrepresentation as factors which can 
influence consensus  
Although mistake and misrepresentation are regarded as two separate factors which can 
influence consensus these factors can in some instances be very closely related. 
Misrepresentations can result in mistakes, this is, however, not always the case. This close 
relationship will be illustrated through reference to two practical examples which are set out 
below. These examples will play a central role in this dissertation. 
                                           
11 Fouche Legal Principles of Contracts and Commercial Law (2015) 51-52. 
12 n 11 above. 
13 n 11 above.  
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Example 1 
Peter (the seller) enters into negotiations with James (the purchaser) in respect of the sale of 
a portion of agricultural land. Peter assures James that the land in question has very high 
levels of available groundwater which has been tested, and which is suitable for irrigation 
farming. James, relying on these representations, purchases the land in question and instructs 
Chris to bore and install a borehole for the purposes of the irrigation required to conduct the 
farming operations. Chris bores but finds practically no water. James obtains knowledge that 
Peter had previously instructed a colleague of Chris to conduct an assessment into the 
availability of groundwater beneath the land in question. The report containing the findings of 
the assessment concluded that there is very little groundwater beneath the land in question. 
The report was delivered to Peter 10 months before the negotiations started.  
This example includes a unilateral mistake regarding the characteristics of the object of 
performance on the side of James who acted on the assurance that the land is question is 
suitable for irrigation farming whereas in actual fact the land is not. This example also includes 
a fraudulent misrepresentation on Peter's part who fraudulently misrepresented that the land 
in question is suitable for irrigation farming when he had knowledge to the contrary.  
Example 2 
Warren (an attorney and businessman) enters into an agreement with Tommy (an 
up-and-coming amateur golf star) in terms of which Warren will pay Tommy's expenses on the 
amateur golf circuit for a period of 3 years in order to assist Tommy in his aspirations to 
become a professional golfer. Warren prepared an agreement regulating the relationship 
between the parties and informed Tommy that the agreement is a sponsorship agreement in 
terms of which Tommy undertakes to wear clothes marketing Warren's business for a period 
of 3 years following the signature of the agreement. However, the agreement also states that 
Tommy will be obligated to, upon the expiry of the 3 year period, repay to Warren an amount 
equal to all of the money received from him during the 3 year period. Tommy is unaware of 
this clause and signs the agreement.  
This example contains a mistake regarding the true nature of the agreement on the part of 
Tommy. Tommy is under the impression that the agreement is a simple sponsorship 
agreement whereas the agreement is in actual fact a loan agreement coupled with an element 
of sponsorship. This example further contains a misrepresentation on the part of Warren who 
misrepresented the nature of the agreement to Tommy.  
   5 
1.5 Problem statement  
This research will consider the complexities which arise when the same set of facts make it 
difficult to distinguish between mistake and misrepresentation as potential causes of action 
available to prejudiced contractants. In order to fully understand how mistake and 
misrepresentation are related, an in-depth exposition of the law will be provided. Practical 
examples will be used to illustrate how the legal principles are applied and why contractants 
must sometimes make an election between mistake and misrepresentation as a potential 
cause of action. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This dissertation will use doctrinal research. The literature review will consider several 
textbooks and seminal case law that describe mistake and misrepresentation, the 
requirements that are set in order to qualify as such, and the practical and legal implications 
associated with each. 
1.7 Overview of chapters  
Chapter 1 is the current chapter which contains an introduction, and further discusses the 
problem statement which will be addressed in this research. Chapter 2 will consider mistake 
as a general concept in our law. This chapter will explore the various types of mistake 
recognised, the requirements applicable in order to successfully prove each of these mistakes, 
and the remedies or consequences that flow from each type of mistake. Chapter 3 will consider 
misrepresentation as a general concept in our law. This chapter will explore the different types 
of misrepresentation recognised, the requirements applicable in order to successfully prove 
each type of misrepresentation, and the remedies or consequences that flow from each of 
these misrepresentations. Chapter 4 will consider the close relationship between mistake and 
misrepresentation through the discussion of practical examples where the same set of facts 
make it difficult to distinguish between mistake and misrepresentation. Chapter 5 will consider 
and provide guidance to contractants on how an election between mistake and 
misrepresentation as causes of action should be approached, and which factors should be 
considered when a contractant makes this election. Chapter 5 will finally summarise the main 
themes discussed and analysed, and conclude this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2: MISTAKE 
2 Mistake as a general concept in the South African law of contract 
Mistake can be defined as the event where a party to a contract, or more than one party, acts 
under a misunderstanding or misapprehension of the facts or events underlying, or 
surrounding, the particular contract in question.14 Our law generally distinguishes between 
three types of mistake: unilateral mistake, mutual mistake and common mistake.15 Before 
dealing with the general distinction between the different types of mistake presently 
recognised and applied in our law, the traditional classification of mistakes must be 
considered. 
2.1 Traditional classification of mistakes 
Mistakes have traditionally been classified according to the contractual elements to which 
each relate.16 
2.1.1 Error in corpore 
The first traditional classification is error in corpore, which refers to a mistake in respect of the 
object of performance of the contract.17 An example of such a mistake can be found in the 
matter of Meresky v Morkel18, where the purchaser of a property (hereinafter referred to as 
"the sale property") believed that the sale property was situated next to a different specified 
property (hereinafter referred to as the "specified property"), when in actual fact the sale 
property was "some 200 to 300 meters away" from the specified property. 
2.1.2 Error in negotio 
The second traditional classification is error in negotio, which refers to a mistake that relates 
to the true nature of the contract or juristic act.19 The matter of Khan v Naidoo provides an 
                                           
14 n 11 above. 
15 Fouche Legal Principles of Contracts and Commercial Law (2015) 54; Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa 
(2016) 366; Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 310, 
distinguish between two categories of mistake, the first being unilateral mistake (which includes both where one party is 
under a wrong impression, and where each party is mistaken and the parties at cross-purposes), and the second being 
common mistake. 
16 Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 89. 
17 n 16 above.  
18 1994 1 All SA 272 (C) 272. 
19 n 16 above. 
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example of a potential error in negotio.20 In this matter an illiterate elderly woman sought to 
escape contractual liability on the basis that she had been misled regarding the nature of the 
document which she had signed.21 The elderly lady believed that she had to sign the document 
in order to have a property transferred to her when in actual fact it was a guarantee.22  
2.1.3 Error in persona 
The third traditional classification is error in persona, which refers to the scenario where one 
of the contractants is mistaken as to the identity of the other contractant.23 A case which serves 
as an example of such a mistake is Kok v Osborne.24 In this matter the seller of an immovable 
property was able to successfully avoid the contract of sale in circumstances where the seller 
was mistaken as to the identity of the purchaser.25 
2.1.4 Error in substantia / in qualitate  
The final traditional classification to be considered is error in substantia, also known as error 
in qualitate, which relates to a mistake regarding the characteristics of the object of 
performance (subject matter of the contract).26 Traditionally our courts have not regarded an 
error in substantia as a material mistake on the strength of which a contract can be avoided.27 
However, the judgment of the SCA in the recent case of Spenmac (Pty) Ltd v Tatrim CC28 may 
have altered the traditional position. In this matter a mistake relating to the right of the owner 
of a single unit (forming part of a two-unit property) to veto the owner of the other unit to 
subdivide his unit, was found to be a material mistake relating to the "true nature of the merx".29 
The court found that based on this mistake it could not be said that the parties had reached 
consensus regarding the subject matter of the contract.30 From this judgment one can infer 
that the test is no longer whether or not the mistake relates to the object of performance or 
                                           
20 1989 3 SA 724 (N). 
21 1989 3 SA 724 (N) 726. 
22 n 21 above.  
23 Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 90. 
24 1993 2 All SA 549 (SE). 
25 1993 2 All SA 549 (SE) 559. 
26 n 23 above.  
27 In the matter of Trollip v Jordaan 1961 1 SA 238 at 239, the Appellate Division held that although the purchaser of a property 
was misled into believing that the property forming the subject of the sale had more afforested land than it actually did, the 
mistake under which the purchaser resorted could be regarded as error in corpore because "it was the property described 
in the title deeds which the appellant had bought, and not some other property". The court accordingly held the agreement 
the be valid irrespective of the error in substantia. 
28 2015 3 SA 46 (SCA). 
29 2015 3 SA 46 (SCA) 55A. 
30 2015 3 SA 46 (SCA) 54D. 
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simply a characteristic of the object of performance, but that the real test is whether the parties 
have in fact reached consensus on the "true nature of the merx". The three general categories 
of mistake will now be considered. 
2.2 Unilateral mistake 
A unilateral mistake can be summarised as the event where one contractant resorts under a 
mistake while the other contractant does not.31 An example which illustrates the concept of a 
unilateral mistake is where a prospective purchaser of a gold ring is under the impression that 
the gold ring is made of solid gold, whereas the seller is aware of the fact that gold ring is 
merely gold plated.32 
As a result of the fact that unilateral mistakes are subjective in nature, it is very difficult for a 
party to prove that a unilateral mistake must be viewed as more than an error in judgment, 
and which justifies that party avoiding liability under the contract.33 This task is made more 
difficult by the doctrine of quasi mutual assent as set out in the matter of Smith v Hughes.34 In 
this matter the court confirmed that where a party acts in such a manner that a reasonable 
person "would believe that he was assenting to the terms" of the proposed agreement, such 
a party will remain bound to the agreement even if the party in question never had the intention 
of being bound thereto.35 This doctrine contends that contractual liability will even arise where 
the parties were not in agreement, if the contract denier created the reasonable belief in the 
mind of the contract asserter that the contract denier had agreed to the contract.36 
In the matter of National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board37 the 
court further elaborated on this issue and confirmed that where the other party did not make 
any misrepresentation, and further did not appreciate that the offer presented was accepted 
under a misunderstanding, then "the scope for a defence of unilateral mistake is very narrow 
if it exists at all". 
This brings us to the question of when a party will be able to avoid contractual liability on the 
basis of a unilateral mistake. To clearly answer this question we have to distinguish between 
                                           
31 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 366. 
32 n 15 above. 
33 n 31 above. 
34 1891 LR 6 QB 597. 
35 1891 LR 6 QB 597 at 607. 
36 Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 98. 
37 1958 2 SA 473 A 479G.  
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instances where we cannot ascribe knowledge of the mistake to the other party, those 
instances where we can ascribe knowledge of the mistake to the other party, and those 
instances where the mistake was caused by the other party.38 
2.2.1 Knowledge of the mistake cannot be ascribed to the other party 
The requirements which a party who seeks to avoid contractual liability based on a unilateral 
mistake must satisfy in order to be successful in such an attempt, were set out in the matter 
of Lake v Caithness.39 
2.2.1.1 Materiality 
At the outset, the party must show that the mistake relates to an essential element of the 
contract, id est the mistake has to be material.40 In the matter of SA Vroue Federasie Tvl v 
Thackwray41 it was confirmed that a mistake in the motive of a contractant will be regarded as 
immaterial if the mistake in question has no impact on the terms of the contract. Even where 
a unilateral mistake will influence the terms of a contract, it does not automatically follow that 
the mistake will entitle the mistaken contractant to avoid liability under the contract. This 
principle was confirmed in the matter of Diedericks v Minister of Lands.42 In Diedericks the 
court found that the doctrine of quasi mutual assent can be used by a contractant to preclude 
a counter contractant from avoiding liability on the basis of a unilateral mistake where such 
unilateral mistake is of an incidental nature, i.e. where such mistake merely relates to the 
reason underlying the contract.43 A party must satisfy the court that he or she would not have 
concluded the contract had he or she known the truth.44 
2.2.1.2 Belief that the mistake is the true agreement 
Secondly, the party must show that he or she believed the mistake to be the true agreement.45 
                                           
38 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 367, 370 and 372. 
39 1997 1 SA 667 (E). 
40 1997 1 SA 667 (E) 672C. 
41 1967 2 SA 468 475B. 
42 1964 1 SA 49 (N). 
43 1964 1 SA 49 (N) 56C.  
44 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 373. 
45 1997 1 SA 667 (E) 672D. 
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2.2.1.3 Reasonableness on the part of the mistaken contractant 
Finally, the party must satisfy the court that the belief of the mistake was "reasonable in the 
circumstances", and that his or her interactions with the other party were reasonable in the 
circumstances.46 A unilateral mistake will not meet the requirement of being reasonable where 
the mistake can be attributed to the mistaken party's own fault.47 However, a mistake will not 
automatically be regarded as reasonable if the mistake cannot be ascribed to the fault of the 
mistaken party. The mistaken party must still prove that the law views the mistake as 
reasonable in the particular circumstances of the matter.48 
2.2.2 Knowledge of the mistake can be ascribed to the other party 
The legal position regarding a unilateral mistake where knowledge of the mistake can be 
ascribed or imputed on the other contractant, was set out in two judgments by the Appellate 
Division. Interestingly enough these judgments were delivered on the same day by different 
full benches. 
2.2.2.1 The first judgment 
In the first judgment, in the matter of National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
v Potato Board49, the court stated that: 
"Our law allows a party to set up his own mistake in certain circumstances in order to escape 
liability under a contract into which he has entered. But where the other party has not made any 
misrepresentation and has not appreciated at the time of acceptance that his offer was being 
accepted under a misapprehension, the scope for a defence of unilateral mistake is very narrow, 
if it exists at all."  
2.2.2.2 The second judgment 
In the second judgment, in the matter of George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd50, the court stated that: 
"When can an error be said to be justus for the purpose of entitling a man to repudiate his 
apparent assent to a contractual term? … If his mistake is due to a misrepresentation, whether 
                                           
46 n 45 above. 
47 In the matter of ABSA Bank Ltd v Jansen van Rensburg 2015 5 SA 521 (GSJ) at 524E, the court confirmed this principle 
and stated that "no matter how material the mistake, the mistaken party will not be able to escape from the contract if his 
mistake was due to his own fault". 
48 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 368. 
49 1958 2 SA 473 (A) 479F-G. 
50 1958 2 SA 465 (A) 471D. 
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innocent or fraudulent, by the other party, then, of course, it is the second party who is to blame 
and the first party is not bound." 
These judgments illustrate the close link that exists between mistake and misrepresentation, 
which will be considered in chapter 4. 
2.2.2.3 The legal principles confirmed in these two Appellate Division judgments 
These judgments that knowledge of the mistake precludes a party from raising quasi-mutual 
assent and that a mistaken party will succeed in avoiding contractual liability if the mistake was 
in fact material.51 This principle was argued with success in Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
(formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis.52 The court confirmed that where 
a party to whom an offer is presented, realised (or if a reasonable man in the position of the 
party would have realised) that the offer presented possibly contains a mistake, such a party 
is under a duty to enquire and confirm that the offer presented is in fact the intended offer.53  
2.2.3 Unilateral mistake caused by the other party 
Our law allows a party to rescind a contract where the party in question was misled by the 
counter contractant, if the misled party can show that, (a) the misrepresentation was material 
and (b) "that he would not have entered into the contract if he had known the truth".54 Of 
relevance to this requirement is the judgment in the matter of Khan v Naidoo where the court 
stated:55 
"…the appellant needed to prove that she would never have signed the guarantee had she 
realised what in truth it was. Her defence [that she was illiterate and tricked into signing the 
contract] could not succeed without such proof, ... For she would have failed to demonstrate 
then that her mistake mattered."  
Mutual and common mistake will now be considered, however, it should be mentioned that 
the concepts of mutual and common mistake are not closely related to misrepresentation 
(which ordinarily result in a unilateral mistake on the part of the victim of the misrepresentation) 
and are only briefly discussed for the purpose of completeness.  
                                           
51 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 371. 
52 1992 3 SA 234 (A). 
53 1992 3 SA 234 (A) 241A. 
54 Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 422F. 
55  1989 3 SA 724 (N) 727G.  
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2.3 Mutual mistake 
A mutual mistake will be present where the contractants to a particular contract are at cross 
purposes, i.e. each contractant is mistaken about the other contractant's state of mind or 
intention.56 The learned authors of the Law of South Africa (hereafter referred to as "LAWSA") 
are of the view that the distinction between a unilateral mistake (where only one party is 
mistaken) and mutual mistake (where the parties misunderstand one another) is not of 
principle, a view in support of which they quote the learned author Stolar who opined that this 
distinction is "of little or no value analytically".57 It is submitted that this distinction does in fact 
have value which comes to the fore when one applies the doctrine of quasi mutual assent to 
cases of mutual mistake. 
2.3.1 Mutual mistake and quasi mutual assent 
Where parties are at cross-purposes, each of the respective parties' mistake must be tested 
against the principle of quasi mutual assent.58 This test can result in three different outcomes.  
In the first outcome, it can be found that neither party's understanding of what was agreed is 
reasonable. This will result in neither party being entitled to rely on the doctrine of quasi mutual 
assent and accordingly no enforceable contract will come into existence. 
In the second outcome, it can be found that one of the parties' understanding of the agreement 
is reasonable. This will result in an enforceable contract coming into existence in accordance 
with that party's understanding.59 
In the third outcome, it can be found that both parties' understanding of the agreement were 
reasonable. In this scenario each of the contractants has a claim to the doctrine of quasi 
mutual assent.60 However, because the our law does not treat the concept of reasonableness 
or the reasonable person test as something which can be applied to determine which of the 
parties were the most reasonable, both parties will pass the test and must be treated equally.61 
The result of this is that the contract must be declared void ab initio for the lack of consensus 
                                           
56 n 31 above. 
57 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 310. 
58 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 375. 
59 n 58 above.  
60 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 376. 
61 n 60 above. 
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reached between the parties because both versions of the contract cannot be applied 
concurrently.62  
2.4 Common mistake 
A common mistake will be present where all the contractants "are of one mind and share the 
same mistake about something other than the state of mind of each other's mind".63 In the 
case of common mistake the contractants are not mistaken about the intention of the other 
contractant, and consequently the parties are in complete agreement, "but each makes the 
same erroneous supposition or assumption about some existing or past fact".64 For this reason 
common mistake is essentially different from unilateral and mutual mistake as the parties are 
still, by definition, ad idem.65 The doctrine of quasi mutual assent will therefore not arise in 
cases of common mistake.66  
2.4.1 Rectification 
Where a common mistake is present in a contract, the parties are still in agreement and it 
cannot be said that dissensus exists. 67 Because the parties are still in agreement they usually  
either "rectify the document themselves", alternatively, choose to merely "perform in 
accordance with their common intention".68  
Where the parties are unable to adopt one of these more informal remedies, a contractant 
(who is a party to a written contract which fails to accurately record the agreement reached 
between the contractants) can: 
a) institute a claim for rectification; or 
 
b) raise rectification as a defence against a claim by a co-contractant based on the 
incorrect recordal of the agreement.69 
                                           
62 n 60 above.  
63 n 31 above and Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 111. 
64 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 314.  
65 Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 111 and Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 
380. 
66 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 380. 
67 n 65 above. 
68 n 65 above. 
69 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 316.  
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In the matter of Swanepoel v Nameng70 the SCA confirmed the established legal principles 
regulating the relationship between rectification and the requirement that contracts have to 
comply with the formalities required by law. The court found that: 
a) where the agreement (which a party seeks to rectify) prima facie complies with the 
formalities set for its validity, then a party is free to seek the rectification thereof; 
 
b) where the agreement (which a party seeks to rectify) does not comply with the 
formalities set for its validity, a party will not be able to claim rectification as no valid 
agreement exists which can be rectified.71 
In Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd72 the court confirmed that reasonableness, 
conversely unreasonableness, in the conduct of the party claiming rectification is irrelevant 
because the parties reached consensus about the terms of the contract. For this reason a 
party seeking to rectify an agreement need not prove that the mistake was reasonable. 
To conclude this section on rectification I wish to quote a paragraph from the judgment in the 
matter of Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Knysna Development Co (Pty) Ltd73 wherein the court 
clearly and concisely set out the test for rectification: 
"When the Plaintiff seeks rectification of the agreement one can hardly expect him to prove how 
the Defendant came to make the mistake. In fact the mechanics of the mistake are irrelevant, 
so also whether it is a reasonable error or not. Whatever happened, once the Court is satisfied 
that the agreement recorded is not the same as the actual agreement arrived the Court will grant 
the rectification."  
This brings me to the end of the theoretical discussion of mistake. The legal principles 
underlying misrepresentation will now be considered. 
  
                                           
70 2010 1 All SA 345 (SCA) 349 par 15–17. 
71 n 70 above.  
72 1994 All 4 SA 27 (C) 37. 
73 1987 2 All SA 222 (C) 224. 
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CHAPTER 3: MISREPRESENTATION 
3 Misrepresentation as a general concept in the South African law of contract 
Misrepresentation can be defined as "a false statement of past or present fact, not law or 
opinion, made by one party to another before or at the time of the contract concerning some 
matter or circumstance relating to [the contract]".74 Misrepresentations can be categorised into 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentations.75 Non-fraudulent misrepresentations are 
misrepresentations which are either made negligently, alternatively, innocently.76 
3.1. Causal and incidental misrepresentation 
Where the contractant who was the subject of the misrepresentation (hereafter referred to as 
the "victim") would not have entered into the contract had he or she been aware of the true 
state of affairs, the misrepresentation is generally referred to as a causal misrepresentation.77 
In those instances where the victim would still have entered into the contract had he or she 
been aware of the true state of affairs, albeit on different terms, such misrepresentation is 
generally referred to as an incidental misrepresentation.78 
3.2 The consequences of a misrepresentation 
Any contractant who was induced by a misrepresentation to enter into a contract or to accept 
less favourable terms, "is entitled to relief whether the misrepresentation was fraudulent 
(intentional), negligent or innocent".79 The kind of misrepresentation will influence the relief 
available to the victim.80 In the case of both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations the 
victim will be entitled to claim rescission of the contract (after which restitution must take 
place), together with compensation for any damages suffered.81 In those instances where 
rescission and damages are claimed together, the claim will be treated as a delictual claim 
and the victim must prove the normal delictual elements.82 In the event where the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent or negligent but the victim elects to claim rescission and 
                                           
74 Hutchinson The Law of Contract in South Africa (2017) 120. 
75 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 318 and 320.  
76 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 320. 
77 Reinecke Remedies for Misrepresentation Inducing a Long-Term Insurance Contract: The Didcott Principle 2009 387 388. 
78 n 77 above. 
79 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 317.  
80 n 79 above. 
81 Van Huyssteen Contract General Principles (2016) 100. 
82 n 81 above. 
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restitution only, or in the case of an innocent misrepresentation, the claim will be treated on 
the contractual basis of improperly obtained consensus.83 
3.3 General requirements that must be proven in order to succeed with a claim based on 
misrepresentation 
The elements required to prove a fraudulent misrepresentation generally overlap with the 
elements required to prove both a negligent misrepresentation as well as an innocent 
misrepresentation. The only element which differs substantially is the element related to the 
intent which can be ascribed to the misrepresentation made. For this reason this dissertation 
will first consider the general requirements to prove a misrepresentation, where after the 
specific requirements applicable to each of the different types of misrepresentation will be 
discussed. Consideration will finally be given to the remedies available to a victim in the case 
of type of misrepresentation. 
3.3.1 The first general requirement to prove a misrepresentation 
The victim must first show that an incorrect material statement, related to a present or past 
fact, was made to him or her during the pre-contractual negotiations phase.84 This requirement 
can be met by a positive statement, a gesture and a non-disclosure. 
3.3.1.1 Misrepresentations in the form of positive statements 
In the matter of Presidency Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Patel85 the court confirmed that: 
a) in order for a statement to qualify as a representation the statement or assertion 
must relate to an ascertainable fact that is distinguishable from an opinion; 
 
b) however, a dishonest opinion86 can be sufficient to support a claim for a fraudulent 
misrepresentation because of the fact that a dishonest opinion falsely reflects the 
state of mind of the person making the representation; and 
                                           
83 n 81 above. 
84 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 318. 
85 2011 5 423 (SCA) 443F-G; In the matter of Lourens v Genis 1962 1 SA 431 (T) 431, the court found that because a 
reasonable person in the position of the victim would have regarded the representation as a prophecy and not a 
representation of an existing fact, the victim was not permitted to claim for damages based on the representation. 
86 The issue of a dishonest opinion in the context of a future event was considered by the court in the matter of Van Heerden 
v Smith 1956 3 SA (O) 276B-C. In this matter the court confirmed that a dishonest erroneous opinion in respect of a future 
event can "form the basis of an action for fraudulent misrepresentation". The claim originates from the "dishonesty of the 
person about the state of his mind", and "not the mere fact that the opinion afterwards proved to be wrong". Where a party 
makes a statement regarding the profitability of a business at some future date, the statement will ordinarily be regarded 
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c) a holistic approach, considering the "terms of the representation and the context 
in which it was made", will be decisive. 
3.3.1.2 Misrepresentations made through gestures 
A misrepresentation can be found present even in the absence of an incorrect express 
statement, as misrepresentations are not exclusively confined to the making of an incorrect 
express statement.87 Gestures and actions can also convey messages and there is therefore 
no reason why a misrepresentation cannot be made through a gesture or action.88 Implied 
misrepresentations by conduct is no different from a misrepresentation which is made by an 
express statement.89 
3.3.1.3 Misrepresentations in the form of silence 
Similar to gestures and actions, silence can also be regarded as a misrepresentation in the 
absence of an express incorrect statement.90 Although parties are not usually expected to 
disclose all material facts related to a particular contract or transaction, parties are in some 
instances under the duty to do so.91 This duty includes the duty to remove a wrong impression 
held by a counter party to a contract.92 This duty is generally referred to as the duty to disclose. 
The circumstances under which a contract is negotiated may give rise to the existence of such 
a duty.93 For example, insurance contracts give rise to a duty to disclose because of the fact 
that the insurer is dependent on the insurance proposer to obtain "all material facts bearing 
on the risk to be undertaken by the insurer".94 Whether a duty to disclose existed must be 
"judged having regard to the particular circumstances of the case".95 
                                           
as an opinion, or a "prophecy of something that would happen" in the future, which will only found a cause of action if the 
opinion was not honestly held [Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 320; American Medicine Co. v 
Stantial & Allerston 1905 26 NR 22 24; and Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA (A) 684 (A) 695C]. 
87 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 321. 
88 n 93 above. 
89 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Thabiso Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 163 (SCA) 168A.  
90 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 322 and National Stevedores (Pty) Ltd v MV Afris Pioneer 2004 
3 SA 88 (N) 94A.  
91 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 322. 
92 n 84 above. 
93 Speight v Glass 1961 1 SA 778 (D) 781. 
94 2004 3 SA 88 (N) 94. 
95 n 100 above. 
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3.3.2 The second general requirement to prove a misrepresentation 
Secondly, the victim must show that the incorrect material statement was wrongfully made to 
him or her by the counter contractant.96 A party will only be able to successfully claim 
rescission of the contract in question where the misrepresentation, or non-disclosure, is of a 
material nature, i.e. relates to a material fact.97 Our courts have on numerous occasions 
pronounced on the nature of the test for materiality. These judgments have, however, not been 
consistent. Some judgments favour an objective test whilst other judgments favour a 
subjective test.98 
3.3.2.1 The correct approach according various leading authorities 
The learned authors of Christie argue that the objective test can only be applied to determine 
whether or not the misrepresented fact, or undisclosed fact, was important enough (when 
considered against the contract as a whole) to meet the requirement of materiality.99 The 
authors are further of the opinion that the objective test cannot be used as support for the 
argument that because a reasonable person would not have believed the misrepresentation 
it, does not to meet the requirement of materiality.100 The authors conclude by stating that a 
fraudster, who makes a misrepresentation to another person who they know (or ought to know) 
is gullible, takes his or her victim as they are and such a person "cannot be permitted to hold 
such a victim to a contract just because a reasonable person would not have been induced by 
the misrepresentation".101 The learned authors of LAWSA similarly prefer a subjective test 
where a representor was dishonest or acted fraudulently.102 
3.3.2.2 The correct approach 
It is submitted that the test must be directed by the kind of misrepresentation involved. One 
will naturally expect the test for materiality in the event of a fraudulent misrepresentation, to 
be an easier test to satisfy than in the event of a negligent or innocent misrepresentation. 
                                           
96 n 84 above. 
97 n 84 above. 
98 See the following judgments for examples where our courts applied an objective test: Pathescope (Union) of SA Ltd v 
Mallinick 1927 AD 292 307; Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 3 All SA 73 (W) 109; and National Stevedores (Pty) Ltd v 
MV Afris Pioneer 2004 3 SA 88 (N) 94. See the following judgments for examples of where our courts applied a subjective 
test: Otto v Heymans 1971 4 SA 148 (T) 157-159; and Orville Investments (Pty) Ltd v Sandfontein Motors 2000 2 886 (T) 
916 F. 
99 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 327. 
100 n 105 above. 
101 n 105 above. 
102 n 84 above.  
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3.3.2.2.1 Misrepresentations of a fraudulent nature 
It is submitted that the correct test in the event of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subjective 
in order to ensure that gullible victims are protected from conscious fraudsters. 
3.3.2.2.2 Misrepresentations of an innocent nature 
It is submitted that the correct test in the event of an innocent misrepresentation is objective.103 
By applying an objective test the person who made an innocent misrepresentation will be 
protected from a counter contractant who seeks to rescind the contract in question in instances 
where he or she acted unreasonably in being misled by the misrepresentation which was 
made without fault. 
3.3.2.2.3 Misrepresentations made negligently 
It is submitted that negligent misrepresentations must be determined on the facts of each 
particular case and that a general test will be unsatisfactory. 
The above proposed distinction will ensure that a person guilty of making an innocent 
misrepresentation is not treated in the same manner as a fraudster, whilst guaranteeing that 
negligent misrepresentations are considered on a case to case basis. 
3.3.3 The third general requirement to prove a misrepresentation 
Thirdly, the victim of a misrepresentation will only be entitled to have a contract rescinded if 
the misrepresentation was made by the counter contractant, or a person for whom the counter 
contractant was responsible, and not in those instances where the statement was made by an 
independent third party.104 This requirement was clearly set out by Watermeyer J in the matter 
of Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck:105 
"It is a general rule of our law that if the fraud which induces a contract does not proceed from 
one of the parties, but from an independent third person, it will have no effect upon the contract. 
The fraud must be the fraud of one of the parties or of a third party acting in collusion with, or 
as the agent of, one of the parties."  
                                           
103 This view is supported by the judgement in the matter of Lourens v Genis 1962 1 SA 431 (T). 
104 n 84 above and Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 316.  
105 1962 1 SA 451 (C) 453C-D. 
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This judgment by Watermeyer J was approved by the full bench of the SCA in Slip Knot 
Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA). 
This concludes the section on the general requirements which a party must prove in order to 
succeed with a claim based on a misrepresentation. The specific requirements which a party 
must prove in order to succeed with a claim based on a fraudulent misrepresentation will now 
be considered. Thereafter consideration will be given to the specific requirements which a 
party must prove in order to succeed with a claim based on a non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
3.4 The specific requirements for a claim based on a fraudulent misrepresentation 
As mentioned above, the victim of a fraudulent misrepresentation can seek rescission of the 
contract in question, claim for any damages suffered as a result of the fraudulent 
misrepresentation, or seek rescission coupled with a claim for damages. Because of the fact 
that the requirements for rescission and damages are different these remedies will be dealt 
with separately. 
3.4.1 The specific requirements a victim must prove in order to succeed with a claim for 
rescission 
In order for a victim to be successful with a claim for rescission on the basis of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation, he or she must show that the incorrect material statement was aimed at 
inducing, and actually induced, him or her to enter into the contract or that the contract caused 
him or her to suffer a loss.106 This requirement essentially consists of two elements.107 Firstly 
the victim must show that the misrepresentation was aimed at inducing the contract. Secondly, 
the misrepresentation must have actually induced the contract. The learned authors of Christie 
phrase these elements somewhat different and state that the victim must prove that the 
misrepresentation was believed and that the contract was entered into on the basis of the 
misrepresentation.108  
                                           
106 n 84 above.  
107 In the matter of Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 2 SA 116 (W) 149-150 the court confirmed that this requirement consists 
of two elements. The court verbalised these two elements as follows: "(e) That [the misrepresentation] was intended to 
induce the person to whom it was made to enter into the transaction sought to be avoided [and] … (f) That the representation 
did induce the contract". 
108 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 328. 
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3.4.1.1 The misrepresentation was aimed at inducing the contract 
A victim will fail in an attempt to prove the first element of this requirement if: 
a) the misrepresentation made to the victim was not "accompanied by the intention 
to induce him to enter into the contract"; or 
 
b) where the misrepresentation was not made to the victim who was "induced by it to 
enter into the contract, but to someone else".109 
3.4.1.2 The misrepresentation actually induced the contract 
In order to satisfy the second element of this requirement a victim must show that the 
misrepresentation is of a causal nature and that he or she was in fact induced by the 
misrepresentation to enter into the contract.110 This is achieved by establishing a causal link 
between the misrepresentation and the conclusion of the contract, i.e. if the misrepresentation 
was not made then the contract would not have been entered into.111 
3.4.1.3 Inducement as a requirement for rescission in the event of a non-disclosure 
In the matter of New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v The Trustees for the time being 
of the SAS Trust112 the court considered the application of the requirement of inducement in 
the context of a fraudulent non-disclosure. The court confirmed that, where a party to a 
contract is under a duty to disclose, a fraudulent non-disclosure can result in the cancellation 
of the contract in question if "the withholding of the fact [was] intended to induce the innocent 
party to conclude the contract". The court did not deal with the second element related to 
actual inducement. This requirement of inducement was again considered in the matter of 
National Stevedores (Pty) Ltd v MV Afris Pioneer.113 In this matter the court stated that the 
failure to disclose will be regarded as fraudulent if, whilst under the duty to disclose, a person 
wilfully withheld information in order to induce the victim to enter into the contract.114 
                                           
109 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 328-329. 
110 n 84 above; It has not been settled in our law whether a party is entitled to claim rescission of an agreement based on a 
misrepresentation in circumstances where the misrepresentation did not influence the decision whether or not the contract, 
but merely influenced the terms on which the contract was entered into.  
111 Cockroft v Baxter 1955 4 SA 93 (C) 100H. 
112 2002 3 All SA 544 (C) 555. 
113 2004 3 SA 88 (N).  
114 n 94 above. 
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From these judgments it is clear to see that the requirement of inducement is not only 
applicable to instances where the misrepresentation took the form of a positive statement, but 
that this requirement must similarly be met in those instances where the fraudulent 
misrepresentation took the form of a non-disclosure. The learned authors of LAWSA argue 
that where a party is under a duty to disclose, he or she will be held to have acted fraudulently 
if he or she foresaw the possibility that a failure to disclose could prejudice the other party.115 
3.4.2 The specific requirements a victim must prove in order to succeed with a claim for 
any damages suffered 
Where a victim seeks to claim the damages which he or she suffered as a result of the 
misrepresentation, he or she must firstly prove that the misrepresentation was made 
fraudulently.116 A representation will meet the requirement of being made fraudulently if it can 
be said that the maker of the "[false] representation…has no honest belief in the truth of his 
statement when he makes it".117 This requirement essentially requires knowledge of the fraud. 
The failure by a contractant to make the necessary enquiries regarding known facts can never 
amount to the absence of an honest belief and will not be sufficient to satisfy this requirement, 
even in those instances where the failure amounts to gross negligence.118 
A victim must further be able to prove and quantify the financial loss suffered as a 
consequence of the misstatement.119 
3.5 The specific requirements for a claim based on a non-fraudulent misrepresentation 
As discussed previously, the category of non-fraudulent misrepresentations include both 
innocent and negligent misrepresentations. Innocent misrepresentations do not have any 
specific requirements and a victim will succeed with a claim based on an innocent 
misrepresentation if he or she can prove all of the general requirements discussed under 3.3. 
above. Negligent misrepresentations do have specific requirements and a misrepresentation 
will only be regarded as negligent if these requirements are met. 
                                           
115 n 84 above.  
116 n 84 above and Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 329. 
117 Rex v Myers 1948 1 SA 375 (A) 382. 
118 Rex v Myers 1948 1 SA 375 (A) 383. 
119 Reivelo Leppa Trust v Kritzinger 2007 4 All SA 794 (SE) 799 at par 10. 
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3.5.1 The specific requirements for a claim based on a negligent misrepresentation 
In line with the general requirements for misrepresentations, both positive statements and 
non-disclosures can be regarded as negligent misrepresentations if the facts surrounding the 
misrepresentation in question meets the requirements.  
3.5.1.1 Positive statements which amount to negligent misrepresentations 
A positive statement will be regarded as a negligent misrepresentation if a reasonable person 
in the position of the person making the representation would have: 
(a) been able to foresee that the statement was potentially incorrect; and 
 
(b) been able to foresee that the victim, in relying on the correctness of the statement, 
would suffer a loss if the statement turned out to be incorrect; and 
 
(c) refrained from making the representation to the victim, alternatively, taken the 
necessary reasonable steps in order to prevent the victim from suffering a loss or 
harm.120 
3.5.1.2 Non-disclosures which amount to negligent misrepresentations 
In those circumstances where a contractant is under a duty to disclose, he or she will be 
deemed to have acted negligently if a reasonable person in his or her position would have 
been able to foresee that the non-disclosure could potentially cause harm to the victim and, 
accordingly: 
(a) either divulge the information not disclosed; or 
 
(b) take the necessary and reasonable steps required to prevent the victim from 
suffering the potential harm envisaged.121 
                                           
120 n 76 above. 
121 n 76 above. 
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3.6. Remedies arising from a fraudulent misrepresentation 
The victim of a contractual misrepresentation made fraudulently can seek different remedies 
depending on whether or not the victim suffered damages as a result of the fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
3.6.1 Those instances where the victim did not suffer any damages 
3.6.1.1 The remedies available 
Where the victim of a causal fraudulent misrepresentation did not suffer any damage as a 
result of the misrepresentation, the only remedy available to the victim will be to seek 
rescission of the contract.122 It has not been settled in our law whether or not a contractant 
can rescind a contract entered into on the basis of an incidental fraudulent 
misrepresentation.123 
3.6.1.2 The election to rescind 
Where a victim intends to rescind the contract he or she is expected to exercise this election 
within a reasonable time, and the failure to do so may serve as evidence to illustrate the waiver 
of the victim's right to claim rescission.124 A victim will only be held to have waived this right if 
it can be shown that the victim in question had complete knowledge of the existence of the 
right at the time when he or she chose to abandon it.125 The requirement that the victim must 
have had complete knowledge of the right before a court will find a waiver is an 
uncompromising requirement.126 This requirement necessitates full knowledge of "all the 
material discrepancies" as well as all the relevant facts.127 Partial information which created a 
suspicion in the mind of a victim will not satisfy the requirement of complete knowledge.128 
                                           
122 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 319. A causal 
misrepresentation is sometime referred to a dolus dans causam contractui.  
123 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 319 and Bowditch v 
Peel & Magill 1921 AD 561 573. 
124 Bowditch v Peel & Magill 1921 AD 561 572-573; Frost v Leslie 1923 AD 276 279. 
125 Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA 684 (A) 698F. 
126 n 125 above. 
127 Feinstein v Niggli 1981 2 SA 684 (A) 699C-D.  
128 n 127 above.   
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3.6.1.3 The consequences flowing from an election to rescind 
It is generally accepted in our law that a party seeking to rescind a contract must be willing 
and able to restore that which he or she received in terms of the contract, to hold otherwise 
would allow such a party to be unjustly enriched.129 However, this is simply the general rule 
which may be departed from where justice so requires.130 For instance, where the party 
seeking to rescind the contract is at no fault for not being able to restore, such a party will not 
be precluded from rescinding based on the party's inability to restore.131 Where a victim can 
restore substantially but not completely, monetary compensation can be paid in order to cover 
any shortfall that may exist between the substantial, and complete restoration.132 
3.6.2 Where the victim suffered damage as a result of the misrepresentation 
3.6.2.1 The remedies available 
A victim of a misrepresentation, who suffered financial loss as a result of the misrepresentation 
made to him or her, enjoys the right to not only rescind the contract but also to claim the 
damages suffered as a result of the misrepresentation.133 It should be emphasised that the 
victim is free to choose between these remedies, and he or she can bring a claim for damages 
irrespective of whether or not the contract is rescinded.134 The learned authors of Christie 
argue that a victim is entitled to claim damages resulting from a fraudulent misrepresentation 
even in those instances where the misrepresentation does not justify rescission of the 
contract.135 
3.6.2.2 The calculation of damages which a victim can claim 
The quantum of the damages which the victim can claim is measured by comparing the 
present financial position of the victim to the financial position the victim would have been in 
had the misrepresentation not been made.136  
                                           
129 North West Provincial Government v Tswaing Consulting CC 2007 (4) SA 452 (SCA) 458. 
130 Harper v Webster 1956 2 SA 495 (FC) 500A.  
131 Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 719 (SCA) 731D-E. 
132 Harper v Webster 1956 2 SA 495 (FC) 502F; and in the matter of Mkhwanazi v Quarterback Investment (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 
SA 549 (GSJ) 568 the court found that the victim was excused from any obligation to restore until such a time as her 
interests in a property had been properly restored by having the property reregistered in her name. 
133 n 122 above. 
134 n 122 above. 
135 Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract in South Africa (2016) 319. 
136 n 122 above. 
   26 
In the case of a causal fraudulent misrepresentation the quantum is usually calculated by 
subtracting "the value of the performance made by the representor" from the value of the 
counter performance made by the victim, plus the value of any consequential loss that the 
victim may have suffered.137 
In the case of an incidental fraudulent misrepresentation the quantum can, by way of example, 
be calculated by "deducting the price that would have been paid if there had been no 
misrepresentation from the price actually paid", plus the value of any consequential loss that 
the victim may have suffered.138 
3.6.2.2.1 The calculation of damages in the event where the contract is rescinded 
Where the victim chooses to rescind the contract, and restitution subsequently takes place, 
the calculation of the quantum does not present difficulty as the quantum will normally be equal 
the costs wasted by the victim.139  
3.6.2.2.2 The calculation of damages in the event where the contract is upheld 
Where the victim chooses not to rescind the contract and the contract is consequently upheld, 
the calculation of the quantum of damages is a more difficult and complicated exercise which 
is dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.140  
3.7 Remedies available to the victim in the event of a non-fraudulent misrepresentation  
3.7.1 The development of the remedies available to a victim in the event of a 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation 
Traditionally our law only permitted a victim to use an innocent misrepresentation to dispute a 
claim and not as a cause of action, however, in the matter of Parke v Hamman 1907 TH 47 
the court confirmed that an innocent misrepresentation does entitle the victim to seek 
rescission and restitution.141 The development of the remedies available to the victim of a non-
fraudulent misrepresentation were further developed in the matter of Hall v Milner142, wherein 
the court held that a victim can also bring a claim for restitutional damages by way of the actio 
                                           
137 n 122 above. 
138 n 122 above. 
139 n 122 above. 
140 n 122 above. 
141 Van Rensburg, Lotz, Van Rhijn, Christie and Sharrock The Law of South Africa Volume 9 (2015) par 321. 
142 1959 2 SA 304 (O) 316D-316H.  
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quanti minoris. This remedy is an alternative to rescission and restitution and is used to claim 
a reduction in the purchase consideration, calculated by subtracting the "actual value of the 
thing sold" from the price paid.143 
The availability of these remedies were confirmed by the Appellate Division in the matter of 
Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes.144 The court found that both the right to cancel the contract and the 
right to claim a reduction in the purchase price are available to a victim if the counter 
contractant made a dictum et promissum145, based on which the victim concluded the contract. 
The court defined a dictum et promissum as "a material statement made by the seller to the 
[victim] during the negotiations, bearing on the quality of the [thing sold]".146 
3.7.2 Remedies available to the victim of a negligent misrepresentation 
In the event of a negligent misrepresentation the victim will be entitled to claim rescission and 
restitution, coupled with a claim for delictual damages.147 
3.7.3 Remedies available to the victim of an innocent misrepresentation 
In the event of an innocent misrepresentation the victim will be entitled to claim rescission and 
restitution, however, the representee will in this instance not have any claim for damages.148 
Where the victim was the buyer in a contract of sale the victim will be entitled to claim a 
reduction in the purchase price by way of the actio quanti minoris.149 
  
                                           
143 1959 2 SA 304 (O) 315H-316A. 
144 1973 3 SA 397 (A) 417. 
145 A material statement made by the seller to the buyer.  
146 1973 3 SA 397 (A) 418A.  
147 n 141 above. 
148 n 141 above.  
149 Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 (A) 417. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MISREPRESENTATION AND MISTAKE 
4 The practical application of the South African legal principles on the examples used to 
illustrate the close relationship between mistake and misrepresentation 
In chapter 1, subchapter 1.4, two practical examples were used to illustrate the close 
relationship between mistake and misrepresentation, and how the same set of facts can give 
rise to both of these causes of action. The legal principles which were canvassed in chapters 
2 and 3 will now be applied and discussed. The application and the discussion of these 
principles will illustrate the difficulties and complexities that can arise when a party is faced 
with an election between these two causes of action. 
Example 1 
4.1 The practical application of our legal principles to example 1 
In the first example we are faced with the presence of a unilateral mistake regarding the 
characteristics of the object of performance, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation. Both 
of these causes of action can be used by James against Peter.  
4.1.1 Mistake as a cause of action in example 1 
The unilateral mistake on James' part is that of an error in substantia or in qualitate. If we apply 
the principles established by the SCA in Spenmac (Pty) Ltd v Tatrim CC150 we are able to 
argue that: 
a) a material mistake regarding the true nature of the object of sale exists;  
as a result of this material mistake 
b) the parties never reached consensus regarding the subject matter of the contract; 
and therefore 
c) no valid and enforceable contract ever came into existence between the parties; 
and 
d) restitution must take place and the parties will have to restore the position as it 
was prior to the contract being entered into. 
                                           
150  n 28 above. 
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This outcome may, however, have unintended consequences as James may want to uphold 
the agreement in order to keep the farm, and not have the agreement declared void ab initio. 
In pursuit of such an outcome James may want to consider misrepresentation as the ground 
on which to proceed. 
4.1.2 Misrepresentation as a cause of action in example 1 
If James is in a position to prove that Peter had knowledge of the report wherein it was 
concluded that there was very little groundwater beneath the land in question, then James will 
most likely be in a position to meet all of the requirements in order to prove a fraudulent 
misrepresentation. This will give James access to the following remedies:  
a) he will be in a position to claim rescission of the contract coupled with a claim for 
any damages suffered as result of the misrepresentation [which is the remedy 
available if he proceeds with the mistake as the cause of action];  
alternatively 
b) he will be in a position to uphold the contract and claim for damages only; or 
alternatively 
c) he will be in a position to bring a claim for the reduction in the purchase price 
through the institution of the actio quanti minoris. 
Finally, according to the learned authors of Christie, James will even be entitled to claim 
damages should a court find that the misrepresentation does not justify rescission of the 
contract. 
Example 2 
4.2 The practical application of our legal principles to example 2 
In the second example, Tommy will attempt to escape contractual liability arising from an 
agreement which he signed. Tommy will be able to dispute the enforceability of the contract 
on the basis of both mistake and misrepresentation.  
4.2.1 Mistake as a cause of action in example 2 
In the event where Tommy seeks to avoid contractual liability on the basis of mistake, such a 
claim will be founded on the traditional classification of error in negotio being a mistake in 
relation to the true nature of the contract or juristic act. 
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4.2.1.1 Error in negotio  
In the matter of Khan v Naidoo the court considered this exact argument, which was presented 
on behalf of an elderly lady who was misled as to the nature of the document which she 
signed.151 The court, in finding against the elderly lady, stated that she had failed to show that 
the mistake mattered and that she would not have signed the contract had she known what it 
really was.152 Therefore if Tommy can convincingly illustrate to the court that he would not 
have signed the contract had he known the true nature of the contract, he will be able to 
exercise his right to have the contract rescinded. In the event where the contract is 
successfully rescinded, restitution must take place. Before dealing with the consequences of 
restitution on Tommy's position, a brief discussion of the implications of the doctrine of quasi 
mutual assent on Tommy and his ability to raise a mistake will be set out below.  
4.2.1.2 Quasi mutual assent  
In accordance with the principles established in the matter of Smith v Hughes153, Tommy will 
be bound to the agreement if he acted in such a manner that a reasonable person in the 
position of Warren "would believe that he was assenting to the terms" of the proposed 
agreement. Also of relevance to this issue is the matter of National Distributors Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Potato Board154 wherein the court held that where a party did not make any 
misrepresentation "then the scope for a defence of unilateral mistake is very narrow if it exists 
at all". Finally, in the matter of George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd155 the court stated that where a 
party's mistake is due to the misrepresentation of the other contractant, the mistaken party is 
not to blame and accordingly will not be bound to the contract in question.  
Although Tommy may have created the impression that he was assenting to the terms of the 
proposed agreement at the time when he signed it, he will nevertheless be in a very good 
position to oppose the application of the doctrine of quasi mutual assent because of the fact 
that the mistake was caused by Warren, and the fact that Warren should have known that 
Tommy was acting under the mistake. Warren was responsible for the preparation of the 
contract and did not bring Tommy's attention to the provision dealing with the repayment.  
                                           
151  1989 3 SA 724 (N). 
152  1989 3 SA 724 (N) 726. 
153  1891 LR 6 QB 597. 
154 1958 2 SA 473 A 479G. 
155 n 50 above.  
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4.2.1.3 The consequences which a remedy resulting in restitution will have on Tommy's 
position 
If Tommy is able to successfully avoid liability on the basis of a unilateral mistake, he will be 
obligated to return all the money which he received from Warren in terms of the contract as 
restitution is a natural consequence of rescission. This outcome will not necessarily satisfy 
Tommy as he will be in a situation very similar to the situation he would have been in upon the 
natural termination of the contract.  
In order to determine if there is perhaps a better outcome for Tommy should he proceed on 
the basis of the misrepresentation as a cause of action, we need to consider the remedies and 
options available to him if he were to proceed with the misrepresentation. 
4.2.2 Misrepresentation as a cause of action in example 2 
If Tommy is in fact able to prove that Warren misrepresented the contract, and that he would 
not have entered into the contract had he know what it really was, then the general principle 
of restitution will require Tommy to be willing and able to restore that which he received in 
terms of the contract. Although, on the face of it, this outcome seems to be the same as the 
outcome where he based his claim on the mistake, it may be treated differently in the event of 
a misrepresentation. In the matter of Harper v Webster156 (a matter which dealt with a 
fraudulent misrepresentation), the court confirmed that this is simply the general rule which 
may be departed from in instances where justice so requires.  
It is submitted that a case brought in terms of a fraudulent misrepresentation will place more 
focus on the conduct of the fraudulent party compared to a case brought on a unilateral 
mistake. This will allow Tommy to argue that, because of the fraudulent conduct of Warren, 
the court in question must depart from the general rule and adjust the requirement of restitution 
according to the interests of justice. Although this is not a legally bulletproof argument it 
certainly attempts to protect the interests of Tommy with much more vigour than a case 
brought on the principles of a mistake. 
This concludes the practical application of the South African legal principles of 
misrepresentation and mistake on the examples used to illustrate the close relationship 
between the causes of action. 
  
                                           
156 1956 2 SA (FC) 500A. 
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CHAPTER 5: HOW TO DECIDE BETWEEN MISREPRESENTATION AND MISTAKE 
5 How a contractant should approach the election between mistake and misrepresentation 
as causes of action 
From the practical application and discussion in chapter 4 it is clear to see how the same facts 
can give rise to both a misrepresentation and a mistake as potential causes of action. This 
discussion further seeks to show how this close relationship can make it very difficult to choose 
between proceeding on the basis of a mistake, alternatively a misrepresentation. This election 
is not a simple exercise and is influenced by many factors and consequences, and should be 
directed by the interests of the prejudiced party.  
5.1 The view of the authors of Christie on this election  
The learned authors of Christie argue that the dicta of Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd157 
serves as authority that a party armed with the election (to proceed either on mistake, 
alternatively on misrepresentation) should proceed on the strength of the misrepresentation 
and not the mistake. It is submitted that the dicta of Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) should 
not be viewed as authority for this proposition as the court simply considered the case at hand 
through the lens of a misrepresentation, and did not express any preference as to the preferred 
cause of action. 
5.2 The correct manner in which to approach this election 
It is submitted that one can only express an opinion on the preferred cause of action if one 
were to oversimplify the election. Whilst one cannot deny that misrepresentation as a cause 
of action provides a prejudiced party with an array of available remedies, as opposed to 
mistake which essentially provides a prejudiced party with a claim for rescission coupled with 
restitution, this election should not be focussed solely on the available remedies but other 
factors also play an important role in this election. 
It is further submitted that, rather than expressing a view on the preferred cause of action, one 
should attempt to identify the most important considerations which a prejudiced contractant 
must consider in order to elect the most appropriate cause of action in his or her 
circumstances. It is my submission that the below considerations are the most crucial 
considerations which a contractant faced with this election must consider in order to choose 
                                           
157 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 422F. 
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the cause of action which will the best protect his or her interests in the particular 
circumstances. 
5.2.1 First consideration 
The first issue which prejudiced contractants must consider is whether or not the agreement 
contains a whole agreement clause. These clauses can also be referred to as an exemption 
clause which exclude pre-contractual representations. The reason why this issue must be 
considered at the outset is because such a clause, if included in the contract, can preclude 
the prejudiced party from raising the existence of certain misrepresentations. Parties are free 
to contractually exclude the remedies available to a representee in the event of a non-
fraudulent misrepresentation.158 
Such a whole agreement clause can read as follows: 
1. This agreement constitutes the sole record of the agreement between the parties 
in relation to the subject matter hereof and neither party will be bound by any 
representation, warranty, promise or the like not recorded herein.  
2. This agreement supersedes and replaces all prior commitments, undertakings, or 
representations, whether oral or written, between the parties in respect of the 
subject matter hereof. 
In the matter of Trollip v Jordaan159 it was held that a clause, which contained a provision that 
no representations were made which induced the contract of sale, precluded the prejudiced 
party from relying on an innocent misrepresentation made by the seller in relation to the object 
of the sale. However, such a clause will not preclude the victim of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation from relying on the misrepresentation as a cause of action because "[o]n 
grounds of public policy the law will not recognise an undertaking by which one of the 
contracting parties binds himself to condone and submit to the fraudulent conduct of the 
other."160 The application of such clauses are therefore limited to non-fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
Where such a clause is included in the agreement in question, and the misrepresentation 
made to the victim was not a fraudulent misrepresentation, then the victim should elect to 
                                           
158 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 73 and Joubert v Faure 1978 3 SA 1028A-B. 
159 1961 1 SA 238 (A). 
160 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 72. 
   34 
proceed on the mistake as a cause of action, provided that the mistake meets the 
requirements set out in chapter 2. Where the misrepresentation was made fraudulently, the 
victim can still proceed on the basis of the misrepresentation.  
5.2.2 The second consideration 
The second issue which litigants must consider is whether they wish to approbate or 
reprobate. It is accepted in our law that where a party elects rescind an agreement that party 
abandons the right to enforce the agreement, as a party cannot both approbate and 
reprobate.161 
The reason why this consideration is of critical importance is the following. Where a litigant, 
with knowledge of the facts which give rise to the causes of action, upholds the agreement he 
or she abandons the right to cancel the agreement at some later stage on the factual 
circumstances. It is further important to realise that where a party proceeds on the basis of a 
mistake he or she can only reprobate, i.e. seek rescission of the contract in question, whereas 
a misrepresentation affords the victim both the right to rescind (reprobate) and the right to 
enforce (approbate). As set out in chapter 2 and applied in chapter 4, the victim of a 
misrepresentation can essentially:  
a) rescind the contract and claim damages; 
 
b) uphold the contract and claim damages; and 
 
c) claim a reduction in the purchase consideration. 
It is vital that a prejudiced contractant is aware of this legal principle in order to ensure that he 
or she does not inadvertently act in a manner which may preclude him or her from enforcing, 
alternatively rescinding, the contract in question at some future date. It is clear that the 
principle of approbation and reprobation can play a major role in a party's election. For these 
reasons a party must carefully consider the effect that proceeding on the ground of mistake, 
thereby reprobating the contract, may have on his or her ability to enforce the contract in the 
future. 
                                           
161 Feinstein v Niggli and Others 1981 2 All SA 92 (A) and Spheris v Flamingo Sweet (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 All SA 304 (W) 309.  
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5.2.3 The third consideration 
Where the facts of a matter give rise to both a mistake and a misrepresentation, and the 
representor is unaware of the mistake on the part of the prejudiced party, the prejudiced party 
must at all times be weary of the risks that are imposed by the doctrine of quasi mutual assent. 
I wish to again refer the reader to the judgment by the court in the matter of Sonap Petroleum 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis162 wherein it was 
stated: 
"...did the party whose actual intention did not conform to the common intention expressed, lead 
the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his declared intention represented his 
actual intention?...To answer this question, a threefold enquiry is usually necessary, namely, 
firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to one party's intention; secondly, who made that 
representation; and thirdly, was the other party misled thereby?...The last question postulates 
two possibilities: Was he actually misled and would a reasonable man have been misled?" 
[Footnotes omitted] 
The risks imposed by this doctrine can result in the scenario where a party is unsuccessful in 
rescinding a contract on the basis on a mistake, where such a party could have successfully 
proceeded on the basis of the misrepresentation. It must, however, always be borne in mind 
that a party who was aware of the mistake on the part of the victim cannot call on the doctrine 
of quasi mutual assent in order to preclude the victim from rescinding the contact.163 
5.3 Conclusion 
This dissertation attempts to set out, in a structured, easily understandable, and orderly 
manner, the legal principles regulating mistake and misrepresentation as potential causes of 
action in the South African law.  
 
The dissertation commenced with a discussion of consensus as a requirement for a legally 
valid and enforceable contract. From this point I moved to explain which factors can result in 
consensus being absent from an agreement. Focus was then placed on two of these factors 
being mistake and misrepresentation. Practical examples were used in order to illustrate, on 
a cursory level, how the same set of facts can sometimes give rise to the scenario where both 
a misrepresentation and a mistake are available to a prejudiced contractant as causes of 
action.  
                                           
162 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239A. 
163 n 58 above. 
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In the substantive chapters (chapters 2 and 3) I considered the legal principles applicable to 
mistake and misrepresentation in great detail. These chapters explained the requirements a 
prejudiced contractant must meet in order to succeed with a case based on either mistake, 
alternatively misrepresentation, in an easily understandable and clear manner. These 
chapters also considered the remedies available to a contractant in the event of a 
misrepresentation, and a mistake being present. These chapters also included references to, 
and discussions of, the most noteworthy judgments dealing with mistake and 
misrepresentation. 
The legal principles discussed in the substantive chapters were, in chapter 4, applied to the 
examples used to illustrate the close relationship between mistake and misrepresentation in 
the introduction. This section dealing with the practical application was aimed at illustrating 
the complexities associated with the election between mistake and misrepresentation where 
the facts of a matter give rise to both.  
In chapter 5 the most crucial considerations which are to be considered by a prejudiced 
contractant contemplating litigation, was set out and discussed. It was submitted that the 
considerations identified will ensure that the correct cause of action is chosen, and that the 
these considerations will assist a prejudiced party to best protect his or her rights and interests. 
This chapter raised three crucial considerations, being exclusion clauses, the conflict between 
enforcement and rescission, and quasi mutual assent. 
To conclude, it is submitted that the South African law effectively deals with all the issues 
related to mistake and misrepresentation and has been well developed. Our law contains a 
wealth of clear and sound jurisprudence directing contractants and illustrating our courts' view 
on these issues and there is therefore no reason why contractants should be caught off-guard. 
Contractants should employ these principles in order to ensure that they enjoy all the available 
remedies where prejudiced by counter contractants. It is the responsibility of a prejudiced party 
or victim to use the remedies available in our law, coupled with the principles established by 
our courts to ensure that the correct cause of action is chosen in order to adequately protect 
his or her rights. I trust that this dissertation will guide contractants in the election between 
mistake and misrepresentation. 
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